Criminal Damage
The Criminal Damage Act 1971 contains three offences:
- S1(1) “basic” criminal damage;
- S1(2) “aggravated” criminal damage; and
- S1(3) arson, ie, criminal damage by fire.
Case examples of damage include:
- Tampering with a machine so that it did not work until repaired – Fisher;
- Trampling down grass – Gayford v Chouler;
- Smearing excrement on the walls of a police cell – Roe v Kingerlee;
- Denting a policeman’s hat, causing a “temporary functional derangement” – Samuel v Stubbs;
- Tipping loads of rubbish on land – Henderson & Battley;
- Painting on pavements (with water soluble paint) – Hardman; and
- Writing a biblical quotation on a concrete pillar – Blake.
Section 10(1) provides that “property” means property of a tangible nature, including: land; wild creatures (or their carcasses); but not including wild mushrooms, fruit or foliage.
Property must belong to another for the s1(1) offence only. Section 10(2) provides that property belongs to any person having: custody or control of it; any proprietary right or interest; or a charge on it.
Basic criminal damage requires intention or recklessness by way of mens rea. Recklessness means subjective recklessness as in Stephenson and R v Gemmell and Richards.
The s1(2) offence requires an intention that the destruction or damage endanger life, or recklessness as to endangering life. Thus the defendant was not guilty in: Steer, when he fired three shots at the window of a house because his act of shooting endangered life and not the damage caused. However, the following defendants were guilty: R v Webster; R v Warwick.
There are two defences in s5(2), which only apply to the s1(1) offence, under which the defendant will have acted with a lawful excuse:
s5(2)(a) – Where the defendant believed that the owner had consented or would have consented had they known of the destruction or damage. See, for example, Jaggard v Dickinson; and
S5(2)(b) – Where the defendant did it to protect some other property which he believed was in immediate need of protection and that the means of protection were reasonable having regard to all the circumstances. See R v Hunt and R v Hill and Hall.